Better short-seed quantum-proof extractors  by Ben-Aroya, Avraham & Ta-Shma, Amnon
Theoretical Computer Science 419 (2012) 17–25
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Theoretical Computer Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Better short-seed quantum-proof extractors
Avraham Ben-Aroya ∗, Amnon Ta-Shma
The Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 September 2010
Received in revised form 24 June 2011
Accepted 29 November 2011
Communicated by M. Hirvensalo
Keywords:
Extractors
Quantum information
Privacy amplification
The bounded storage model
a b s t r a c t
We construct a strong extractor against quantum storage thatworks for everymin-entropy
k, has logarithmic seed length, and outputsΩ(k) bits, provided that the quantum adversary
has at most βk qubits of memory, for any β < 12 . The construction works by first
condensing the source (with minimal entropy-loss) and then applying an extractor that
works well against quantum adversaries when the source is close to uniform.
We also obtain an improved construction of a strong quantum-proof extractor in the
high min-entropy regime. Specifically, we construct an extractor that uses a logarithmic
seed length and extracts Ω(n) bits from any source over {0, 1}n, provided that the min-
entropy of the source conditioned on the quantum adversary’s state is at least (1−β)n, for
any β < 12 .
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the privacy amplification problemAlice and Bob share information that is only partially secret with respect to an eaves-
dropper Charlie. Their goal is to distill this information to a shorter string that is completely secret. The problem was intro-
duced in [2,1] for classical eavesdroppers. An interesting variant of the problem, where the eavesdropper is allowed to keep
quantum information rather than just classical information, was introduced by König et al. [15]. This situation naturally oc-
curs in analyzing the security of some quantum key-distribution protocols [4] and in bounded-storage cryptography [18,16].
The shared information between Alice and Bob ismodeled as a shared string x ∈ {0, 1}n, sampled according a distribution
X . The information of the eavesdropper is modeled as a mixed state, ρ(x), which might correlated with x.
The privacy amplification problem can be solved by Alice and Bob, but only by using a (hopefully short) random seed
y, which can be public. Thus, Alice and Bob look for a function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m that acts on their shared
input x and the public random string y, and extracts ‘‘true randomness’’ for any ‘‘allowed’’ classical distribution X and side
information ρ(X). More formally, E is an ϵ-strong extractor for a family of inputsΩ , if for any distribution X and any quantum
system ρ such that (X; ρ) ∈ Ω , the distribution Y ◦E(X, Y )◦ρ is ϵ-close to U ◦ρ, where U denotes the uniform distribution.
(See Section 2.2 for precise details.)
Clearly, no randomness can be extracted if, for every x, it is possible to recover x from the side information ρ(x). We say
the conditional min-entropy of X with respect to ρ(X) is k, if an adversary holding the state ρ(x) cannot guess the string x
with probability higher than 2−k. Roughly speaking, if one can extract k almost uniform bits from a source X in spite of the
side information ρ(X), then the state X ◦ ρ(X) is close to another state with conditional min-entropy at least k.1 Thus, in
a very concrete sense, the ultimate goal is finding extractors for sources with high conditional min-entropy.2 We say E is a
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +972 3 6407885.
E-mail address: abrhambe@tau.ac.il (A. Ben-Aroya).
1 Such a source is said to have conditional smoothmin-entropy k.
2 A simple argument shows an extractor for sources with high conditional min-entropy is also an extractor for sources with high conditional smooth
min-entropy.
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Table 1
Explicit quantum-proof (n, k, ϵ) strong extractors. To simplify parameters, the error ϵ is a constant.
No. of truly random bits No. of output bits Classical Quantum-proof
O(n) m = k− O(1) Pair-wise independence, [14] X[15]
O(n− k+ log n) m = n Fourier analysis, collision [7] X[10]
Θ(m) m = k− O(1) Almost pair-wise ind., [22,12] X, [25]
O( log
2 n
log(k) ) k
1−ζ Designs, [26] X, [6]
O(log n) m = Ω(n) [19,3] X, This paper, provided k > ( 12 + ζ )n
log n+ O(1) m = k− O(1) Lower bound [19,20] X
quantum-proof (n, k, ϵ) strong extractor if it extracts randomness from every input (X; ρ)with conditional min-entropy at
least k.
Not every classical extractor3 is quantum-proof, as was shown by Gavinsky et al. [11]. On the positive side, several well-
known classical extractors are quantum-proof. Table 1 lists some of these constructions. We remark that the best explicit
classical extractors [13,9,8] achieve significantly better parameters than those known to be quantum-proof.
A simpler adversarial model is the ‘‘bounded storage model’’ where the adversary may store a limited number of qubits.
The only advantage of the bounded storage model for extractors is that it simplifies the proofs, and allows us to achieve
results which currently we cannot prove in the general model. We say E is an (n, k, b, ϵ) strong extractor against quantum
storage if it extracts randomness from every pair (X; ρ) for which X has at least k min-entropy and for every x, ρ(x) is a
mixed state with at most b qubits.
In this paper wework with a slight generalization of the bounded storagemodel. We say E is a quantum-proof (n, f , k, ϵ)
strong extractor for flat distributions if it extracts randomness from every input (X; ρ) for which X is a flat distribution
(meaning it is uniform over its support) with exactly f min-entropy and the conditional min-entropy is at least k. In
Lemma 2.4 we prove the easy observation that any quantum-proof (n, f , k, ϵ) strong extractor for flat distributions is also
a (n, f , f − k, ϵ) strong extractor against quantum storage.
We show a generic reduction from the problem of constructing quantum-proof (n, f , k, ϵ) strong extractors for flat
distributions to the problem of constructing quantum-proof ((1+ α)f , f , k, ϵ) strong extractors for flat distributions, and a
similar reduction for the bounded storage model. In other words, in our model the quantum adversary may have two types
of information about the source: first, it may have some classical knowledge about it, reflected in the fact that the input x
is taken from some classical flat distribution X , and second, it holds a quantum state that contains some information about
the source. The reduction shows that without loss of generality we may assume the classical input distribution is almost
uniform. The reduction uses a purely classical object called a strong lossless condenser and extends work done in [24] on
extractors to quantum-proof extractors. This reduction holds for any setting of the parameters.
We then augment thiswith a simple construction that showshow to obtain a quantum-proof ((1+α)f , f , k = (1−β)f , ϵ)
strong extractor for flat distributions, provided that β < 12 . The argument here builds on work done in [19] on the
composition of extractors and extends it to quantum-proof extractors. Together, these two reductions give:
Theorem 1.1. For any β < 12 and ϵ ≥ 2−k
β
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, k, (1− β)k, ϵ) strong extractor for flat
sources E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m with seed length t = O(log n+ log ϵ−1) and output length m = Ω(k).
Consequently,
Theorem 1.2. For any β < 12 and ϵ ≥ 2−k
β
, there exists an explicit (n, k, βk, ϵ) strong extractor against quantum storage,
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n+ log ϵ−1) and output length m = Ω(k).
This gives the first logarithmic seed length extractor against b quantum storage that works for every min-entropy k and
extracts a constant fraction of the entropy, and it is applicable whenever b = βk for β < 12 .
We would like to stress that in most practical applications, and in particular in cryptographic applications such as
quantum key distribution, it is generally impossible to bound the size of the side information. For example, in quantum key
distributionwhere extractors are used for privacy amplification, the conditional min-entropy of the source can be estimated
by measuring the noise on the channel, whereas any estimate on the adversary’s memory is an unproven assumption.
Thus, an extractor proven to work only against quantum storage cannot be used in quantum key distribution protocols. We
nevertheless feel that proving a result in the bounded storage model may serve as a first step towards solving the general
question.
In fact, the second component in the above construction also works in the general quantum-proof setting. Specifically,
this gives an extractor with seed length t = O(log n + log ϵ−1) that extracts Ω(n) bits from any source with conditional
min-entropy at least (1− β)n for β < 12 .
Theorem 1.3. For any β < 12 and ϵ ≥ 2−n
β
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, (1 − β)n, ϵ) strong extractor
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n+ log ϵ−1) and output length m = Ω(n).
3 We refer to extractors that extract randomness when the side information is classical as classical extractors.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains all the necessary preliminaries, including the formal
definitions of min-entropy, quantum-proof extractors and extractors against quantum storage. In Section 3 we give the
reduction which shows it is sufficient to construct extractors for sources with nearly full min-entropy, when working in the
bounded storage or flat sources settings. In Section 4 we describe the construction of quantum-proof extractors when the
conditional min-entropy is more than half, and give the proof of Theorem 1.3. The proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 are given
in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
Distributions. A distribution D onΛ is a function D : Λ→ [0, 1] such thata∈Λ D(a) = 1. We denote by x∼D sampling x
according to the distribution D. Let Ut denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}t . We measure the distance between two
distributions with the variational distance |D1 − D2|1 = 12

a∈Λ |D1(a)− D2(a)|. The distributions D1 and D2 are ϵ-close if|D1 − D2|1 ≤ ϵ.
The min-entropy of D is denoted by H∞(D) and is defined to be
H∞(D) = min
a:D(a)>0
− log(D(a)).
If H∞(D) ≥ k then for all a in the support of D it holds that D(a) ≤ 2−k. A distribution is flat if it is uniformly distributed
over its support. Every distributionDwithH∞(D) ≥ k can be expressed as a convex combinationαiDi of flat distributions
{Di}, each with min-entropy at least k. We sometimes abuse notation and identify a set X with the flat distribution that is
uniform over X .
If X is a distribution overΛ1 and f : Λ1 → Λ2 then f (X) denotes the distribution overΛ2 obtained by sampling x from
X and outputting f (x). If X1 and X2 are correlated distributions we denote their joint distribution by X1 ◦ X2. If X1 and X2 are
independent distributions we replace ◦ by× and write X1 × X2.
Mixed states. A pure state is a vector in some Hilbert space. A general quantum system is in a mixed state — a probability
distribution over pure states. Let {pi, |φi⟩} denote the mixed state where the pure state |φi⟩ occurs with probability pi. The
behavior of the mixed state {pi, |φi⟩} is completely characterized by its density matrix ρ = i pi |φi⟩⟨φi|, in the sense that
two mixed states with the same density matrix have the same behavior under any physical operation. Notice that a density
matrix over a Hilbert spaceH belongs to Hom(H,H), the set of linear transformation fromH toH . Density matrices are
positive semi-definite operators and have trace 1.
The trace distance between density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 is ∥ρ1 − ρ2∥tr = 12

i |λi|, where {λi} are the eigenvalues of
ρ1 − ρ2. The trace distance coincides with the variational distance when ρ1 and ρ2 are classical states (ρ is classical if it is
diagonal in the standard basis). Similarly to probability distributions, the density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 are ϵ-close if the trace
distance between them is at most ϵ.
A positive operator valuedmeasure (POVM) is themost general formulation of ameasurement in quantum computation.
A POVM on a Hilbert spaceH is a collection {Fi} of positive semi-definite operators Fi : Hom(H,H) → Hom(H,H) that
sum-up to the identity transformation, i.e., Fi ≽ 0 and Fi = I . Applying a POVM F = {Fi} on a density matrix ρ results in
the distribution F(ρ) that outputs iwith probability Tr(Fiρ).
A Boolean measurement {F , I − F} ϵ-distinguishes ρ1 and ρ2 if |Tr(Fρ1)− Tr(Fρ2)| ≥ ϵ.
We shall need the following facts regarding the trace distance.
Fact 2.1. If ∥ρ1 − ρ2∥tr = δ then there exists a Boolean measurement that δ-distinguishes ρ1 and ρ2.
Fact 2.2. If ρ1 and ρ2 are ϵ-close then E(ρ1) and E(ρ2) are ϵ-close, for any physically realizable transformation E .
2.1. Min-entropy
To define the notion of quantum-proof extractors we first need the notion of quantum encoding of classical states.
Definition 2.1. Let X be a distribution over some setΛ.
• An encoding of X is a collection ρ = {ρ(x)}x∈Λ of density matrices.• An encoding ρ is a b-storage encoding if ρ(x) is a mixed state over b qubits, for all x ∈ Λ.
• An encoding is classical if ρ(x) is classical for all x.
The average encoding is denoted by ρ¯X = Ex∼X [ρ(x)].
Nextwedefine the notion of conditionalmin-entropy. The conditionalmin-entropy ofX givenρ(X)measures the average
success probability of predicting x given the encoding ρ(x). Formally,
Definition 2.2. The conditional min-entropy of X given an encoding ρ is
H∞(X; ρ) = − log sup
F
E
x∼X
[Tr(Fxρ(x))],
where the supremum ranges over all POVMs F = {Fx}x∈Λ.
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We remark that there exists another definition of conditional min-entropy in the quantum setting, which is more
algebraic in flavor. However, the two definitions are equivalent, as shown in [17].
Proposition 2.1 ([18, Proposition 2]). If ρ is a b-storage encoding of X then H∞(X; ρ) ≥ H∞(X)− b.
We shall need the following standard lemmas regardingmin-entropy that can be found, e.g., in [21]. The first lemma says
that cutting ℓ bits from a source cannot reduce the min-entropy by more than ℓ.
Lemma 2.1. Let X = X1 ◦ X2 be a distribution over bit strings and ρ be an encoding such that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k, and suppose that
X2 is of length ℓ. Let ρ ′ be the encoding of X1 defined by ρ ′(x1) = Ex∼(X |X1=x1)[ρ(x)]. Then, H∞(X1; ρ ′) ≥ k− l.
Proof. Given any predictor P ′ which predicts X1 from ρ ′, we can construct a predictor P for X (from ρ) as follows: P simply
runs P ′ to obtain a prediction for the prefix x1, and then appends it with a randomly chosen string from {0, 1}ℓ. Then,
Pr
x1◦ x2∼X
[P(ρ(x1 ◦ x2)) = x1 ◦ x2] = Pr
x1◦ x2∼X
[P ′(ρ(x1 ◦ x2)) = x1] · 2−ℓ
= Pr
x1∼X1
[P ′(ρ ′(x1)) = x1] · 2−ℓ.
Thus, if H∞(X1; ρ ′) < k − l then there would have been a predictor which predicts X with probability greater than 2−k
and this cannot be the case since H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k. 
The second lemma says that if a source has high min-entropy, then revealing a short prefix (with high probability) does
not change the min-entropy much. The lemma is a generalization of a well known classical lemma.
Lemma 2.2. Let X = X1 ◦ X2 be a distribution and ρ be an encoding such that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k, and suppose that X1 is of length
ℓ. For a prefix x1, let ρx1 be the encoding of X2 defined by ρx1(x2) = ρ(x1 ◦ x2). Call a prefix x1 bad if H∞(X2 | X1 = x1; ρx1) ≤ r
and denote by B the set of bad prefixes. Then,
Pr[X1 ∈ B] ≤ 2ℓ · 2r · 2−k.
Proof. Let the prefix x′1 ∈ B be the one with the largest probability mass. Then, Pr[X1 = x′1] ≥ Pr[X1 ∈ B] · 2−ℓ. For any
z ∈ B, let Az denote the optimal predictor that predicts X2 from ρz , conditioned on X1 = z. By the definition of min-entropy,
for any z ∈ B,
E
x2∼(X2|X1=z)
Pr[Az(ρz(x2)) = x2] ≥ 2−r .
In particular this holds for z = x′1.
Now, define a predictor P for X from ρ by
P(ρ(x)) = x′1 ◦ Ax′1(ρ(x)),
that is, P simply ‘‘guesses’’ that the prefix is x′1 and then applies the optimal predictor Ax′1 . The average success probability
of P is
E
x∼X

Pr[P(ρ(x)) = x] = E
x1∼X1

E
x2∼(X2|X1=x1)

δx1,x′1 · Pr[Ax′1(ρx′1(x2)) = x2]

= Pr[X1 = x′1] · E
x2∼(X2|X1=x′1)

Pr[Ax′1(ρx′1(x2)) = x2]

≥ Pr[X1 ∈ B] · 2−ℓ · 2−r
On the other hand, since H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k, the average success probability of P is at most 2−k. Altogether, Pr[X1 ∈ B] ≤
2ℓ · 2r · 2−k. 
2.2. Quantum-proof extractors
We now define the three different classes of extractors against quantum adversaries that we deal with in this paper. We
begin with the most general (and natural) definition:
Definition 2.3. A function E : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (n, k, ϵ) strong extractor if for every distribution
X over {0, 1}n and every encoding ρ such that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k,
∥Ut ◦ E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X∥tr ≤ ϵ.
Weuse ◦ to denote correlated values. Thus,Ut ◦E(X,Ut)◦ρ(X) denotes themixed state obtained by sampling x∼X, y∼Ut
and outputting |y, E(x, y)⟩⟨y, E(x, y)| ⊗ρ(x). Notice that all 3 registers are correlated. When a register is independent of the
others we use× instead of ◦. Thus, Ut+m× ρ¯X denotes the mixed state obtained by sampling x∼X, w∼Ut+m and outputting
|w⟩⟨w| ⊗ρ(x).
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Next we define quantum-proof extractors for flat distributions:
Definition 2.4. A function E : {0, 1}n× {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (n, f , k, ϵ) strong extractor for flat distributions
if for every flat distribution X over {0, 1}n with exactly f min-entropy and every encoding ρ of X with H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k,
∥Ut ◦ E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X∥tr ≤ ϵ.
We remark that in the classical setting every extractor for flat distributions is also an extractor for general distributions,
since every distributionwithmin-entropy k can be expressed as a convex combination of flat distributions over 2k elements.
Finally we define extractors against quantum storage:
Definition 2.5. A function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is an (n, k, b, ϵ) strong extractor against quantum storage if for
every distribution X over {0, 1}n with H∞(X) ≥ k and every b-storage encoding ρ of X ,
∥Ut ◦ E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X∥tr ≤ ϵ.
The next lemma shows it sufficient to consider only flat distributions when arguing about the correctness of extractors
against quantum storage.
Lemma 2.3. If E is not an (n, k, b, ϵ) strong extractor against quantum storage then there exists a set X of cardinality 2k and a
b-storage encoding ρ such that E fails on (X; ρ), that is,
∥Ut ◦ E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X∥tr > ϵ.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive, i.e., we assume that E works for flat distributions of min-entropy exactly k and prove
that it also works for general distributions with at least kmin-entropy.
Suppose X is a distribution with H∞(X) ≥ k. Then X can expressed as a convex combination of flat distributions Xi each
with H∞(Xi) = k. If ρ is a b-storage encoding of X then it is also a b-storage encoding of each of these flat distributions Xi.
Thus, by assumption,Ut ◦ E(Xi,Ut) ◦ ρ(Xi)− Ut+m × ρ¯Xitr ≤ ϵ.
Now by convexity,
∥Ut ◦ E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X∥tr ≤ ϵ,
as desired. 
Combining this with Proposition 2.1 we get:
Lemma 2.4. Every quantum-proof (n, f , k, ϵ) strong extractor for flat distributions, is an (n, f , f −k, ϵ) strong extractor against
quantum storage.
2.3. Lossless condensers
Definition 2.6 (Strong Condenser). A mapping C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n′ is an (n, k1)→ϵ (n′, k2) strong condenser if
for every distribution X with k1 min-entropy, Ud ◦ C(X,Ud) is ϵ-close to a distribution with d+ k2 min-entropy.
One typically wants to maximize k2 and bring it close to k1 while minimizing n′ (it can be as small as k1 + O(log ϵ−1))
and d (it can be as small as log((n− k)/(n′ − k))+ log ϵ−1 + O(1)). For a discussion of the parameters, see [3, Appendix B].
We call the condenser lossless if k2 = k1.
The property of lossless condensers that we shall use is the following.
Fact 2.3 ([23, Lemma 2.2.1]). Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n′ be an (n, k) →ϵ (n′, k) lossless condenser. Consider the
mapping
C ′ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n′ × {0, 1}d
C ′(x, y) = C(x, y) ◦ y.
Then, for every set X ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |X | ≤ 2k, there exists a mapping C ′′ : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}n′×{0, 1}d that is injective
on X × {0, 1}d and agrees with C ′ on at least 1− ϵ fraction of the set X × {0, 1}d.
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3. A reduction to full classical entropy
A popular approach for constructing explicit extractors in the classical setting is as follows:
• Construct an explicit extractor for the high min-entropy regime, i.e., for sources X distributed over {0, 1}n that have k
min-entropy for some large k close to n, and,
• Show a reduction from the general case to the high min-entropy case.
In the classical setting this is often achieved by composing an extractor for the high min-entropy regime with a classical
lossless condenser. Specifically, assume:
• C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n′ is an (n, k)→ϵ1 (n′, k) strong lossless condenser, and,
• E : {0, 1}d+n′ × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a (d+ n′, d+ k, ϵ2) strong extractor.
Define EC : {0, 1}n × ({0, 1}d × {0, 1}t)→ {0, 1}m by
EC(x, (y1, y2)) = E((C(x, y1), y1), y2).
In the classical setting, [24, Section 5] prove that EC is a strong (n, k, ϵ1+ϵ2) extractor. In this sectionwe try to generalize
this result to the quantum setting. We prove:
Theorem 3.1. Let C and EC be as above.
• If E is a quantum-proof (d+n′, d+k, k2, ϵ2) strong extractor for flat distributions, then EC is a (n, k, k2, ϵ = ϵ2+2ϵ1) strong
extractor for flat distributions.
• If E is a (d + n′, d + k, d + b, ϵ2) strong extractor against quantum storage, then EC is an (n, k, b, ϵ = ϵ2 + 2ϵ1) strong
extractor against quantum storage.
The intuition behind the theorem is the following. When the condenser C is applied on a flat source, it is essentially
a one-to-one mapping between the source X and its image C(X). Therefore, roughly speaking, any quantum information
about x can be translated to quantum information about C(x) and vice-versa. To make this precise we need to take care of
the condenser’s seed, and this incurs a small loss in the parameters.
We first prove the second item.
Proof (Second Item). Assume, by contradiction that EC is not an (n, k, b, ϵ = ϵ2 + 2ϵ1) strong extractor against quantum
storage. Then, by Lemma 2.3, there exists a subset X ⊆ {0, 1}n of cardinality 2k and a b-storage encoding ρ of X such that,
given this encoding, the output of the extractor EC is not ϵ-close to uniform. That is,
∥Ut+d ◦ EC(X,Ut+d) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+d+m × ρ¯X∥tr > ϵ.
In particular, by Fact 2.1, there exists some Boolean measurement that ϵ-distinguishes the two distributions. Since the
first two components are classical, we can represent this measurement as follows. For every y ∈ {0, 1}t+d and z ∈ {0, 1}m
there exists a Boolean measurement {F y,z, I − F y,z} on the quantum component such that Ex∼X, y∼UTrF y,EC(x,y)ρ(x)− Ey,z∼UTrF y,z ρ¯X
 > ϵ.
We now show how this can be used to break the extractor E. Consider the set A = X × {0, 1}d. By Fact 2.3, there exists a
mapping D that is injective on A and agrees with the condenser on at least 1− ϵ1 fraction of A. Denoting B = D(A), it is clear
that H∞(B) ≥ d+ k.
For (x˜, y˜) ∈ Bwe define the encoding
ρ ′(x˜, y˜) = |y1⟩⟨y1| ⊗ρ(D←(x˜, y˜)),
where (x, y1) = D−1(x˜, y˜) ∈ A is the unique element such that D(x, y1) = (x˜, y˜), and D←(x˜, y˜) = x.
Next, we define a measurement

F
y2,z
, I − F y2,z

that given the input y2 ∈ {0, 1}t , z ∈ {0, 1}m and ρ ′(x˜, y˜) =
|y1⟩⟨y1| ⊗ρ(x), sets y = (y1, y2) and applies the measurement {F y,z, I − F y,z} on the quantum register ρ(x).
Now, Eb∼B, y2∼UtTrF y2,E(b,y2)ρ ′(b)− Ex∼X, y∼Ud+tTrF y,EC(x,y)ρ(x)
 ≤ ϵ1,
since the flat distribution over B is ϵ1-close to the distribution obtained by sampling x ∈ X , y1 ∈ Ud and outputting
(C(x, y1), y1). For the same reason, averaging over B for F is almost as averaging over X for F . Namely, Ey2,z∼UTrF y2,z ρ¯ ′B− Ey,z∼UTrF y,z ρ¯X
 ≤ ϵ1.
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It follows that Eb∼B, y2∼UTrF y2,E(b,y2)ρ ′(b)− Ey2,z∼UTrF y2,z ρ¯ ′B
 ≥  Ex∼X, y∼UTrF y,EC(x,y)ρ(x)− Ey,z∼UTrF y,z ρ¯X
− 2ϵ1
> ϵ − 2ϵ1 = ϵ2.
Clearly ρ ′ is a (d+ b)-storage encoding of B. This contradicts the fact that E is a strong extractor against d+ b quantum
storage. 
We now prove the first item.
Proof (First Item). Assume, for contradiction, that EC is not a quantum-proof (n, k, k2, ϵ) strong extractor for flat
distributions. Then there exists a subset X ⊆ {0, 1}n of cardinality exactly 2k and an encodingρ of X such that the conditional
min-entropy is at least k2 but given this encoding the output of the extractor EC is not ϵ-close to uniform. The proof proceeds
as before, defining the Boolean measurement F , the sets A and B, the encoding ρ ′ and the measurement F . If we can show
that H∞(B; ρ ′) ≥ k2 then we break the extractor E and reach a contradiction. Indeed:
Claim 3.1. H∞(B; ρ ′) ≥ k2.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that H∞(B; ρ ′) < k2. Then, there exists a predictorW ′ such that
Pr
b∼B[W
′(ρ ′(b)) = b] > 2−k2 .
Define a new predictor,W , that given ρ(x)works as follows. FirstW chooses y∼Ud and runsW ′ on |y⟩⟨y| ⊗ρ(x) to get some
answerb. It then outputs D←(b).
The success probability of the predictorW is
Pr
x∼X[W (ρ(x)) = x] = Prx∼X,y∈{0,1}d[D
←(W ′(|y⟩⟨y| ⊗ρ(x))) = x]
≥ Pr
x∼X,y∈{0,1}d
[W ′(|y⟩⟨y| ⊗ρ(x)) = D(x, y)]
= Pr
b∼B[W
′(ρ ′(b)) = b] > 2−k2 .
This contradicts the fact that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k2. 

We remark that we do not know how to extend the proof to work with lossy condensers.
4. An explicit quantum-proof extractor for the high-entropy regime
In this section we describe a construction of a short-seed quantum-proof (n, k, ϵ) strong extractor that works whenever
k ≫ n/2. In the classical setting this scenario was studied in [3], developing and improving techniques from [19] and other
papers. Here we only need the techniques developed in [19].
Intuitively, the extractor E that we construct works as follows. First, it divides the source to two parts of equal length.
Since the min-entropy is larger than n/2, for almost any fixing of the first part of the source, the distribution on the second
part hasΩ(n)min-entropy. Hence, applying an extractor E2 on the secondpart results in output bits that are close to uniform.
Since this is true for almost every fixing of the first part, these output bits are essentially independent of the first part of
the source. Therefore, these output bits can serve as a seed for another extractor, E1, that is applied on the first part of the
source.
Formally, assume:
• E1 : {0, 1}n/2 × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}m1 is a quantum-proof ( n2 , n2 − b, ϵ1) strong extractor, and,
• E2 : {0, 1}n/2 × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}d1 is a quantum-proof ( n2 , k, ϵ2) strong extractor.
Define E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m1 by
E(x, y) = E1(x1, E2(x2, y)),
where x = x1 ◦ x2 and x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n/2.
Theorem 4.1. Let E1, E2 and E be as above with k = n2 − b− log ϵ−1. Then E is a quantum-proof (n, n− b, ϵ + ϵ1 + ϵ2) strong
extractor.
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Proof. Let X = X1 ◦X2 be a distribution on {0, 1}n = {0, 1}n/2×{0, 1}n/2 and ρ be an encoding such that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ n−b.
For a prefix x1 ∈ {0, 1}n/2, let ρx1 be the encoding of X2 defined by ρx1(x2) = ρ(x1 ◦ x2). A prefix x1 is said to be bad if
H∞(X2 | X1 = x1; ρx1) ≤ k. By Lemma 2.2, the probability x1 (sampled from X1) is bad is at most
2n/2 · 2k
2n−b
= 2
n/2 · 2n/2−b−log ϵ−1
2n−b
= ϵ.
Whenever x1 is not bad, H∞(X2 | X1 = x1; ρx1) > k, that is, the extractor E2 is applied on a distribution with k min-
entropy. Therefore, by the assumption on E2, its output is ϵ2-close to uniform. That is, for every good x1,Ud2 ◦ x1 ◦ E2(X2,Ud2) ◦ ρx1(X2)− Ud2 ◦ x1 ◦ Ud1 ◦ ρx1(X2)tr ≤ ϵ2.
Hence, the distribution Ud2 ◦ X1 ◦ E2(X2,Ud2) ◦ ρ(X) is (ϵ + ϵ2)-close to Ud2 ◦ X1 ◦ Ud1 ◦ ρ(X). In particular,Ud2 ◦ E(X,Ud2) ◦ ρ(X)− Ud2+d1 ◦ ρ¯Xtr = Ud2 ◦ E1(X1, E2(X2,Ud2)) ◦ ρ(X)− Ud2+d1 ◦ ρ¯Xtr
≤ ϵ + ϵ2 +
Ud2 ◦ E1(X1,Ud1) ◦ ρ(X)− Ud2+d1 ◦ ρ¯Xtr ,
where the last inequality follows from Fact 2.2.
Since, H∞(X; ρ) ≥ n − b, by Lemma 2.1, if we define an encoding ρ ′ of X1 by ρ ′(x1) = Ex∼(X |X1=x1)[ρ(x)], then
H∞(X1; ρ ′) ≥ n− b− n/2 = n/2− b. Therefore, by the assumption on E1 we getE1(X1,Ud1) ◦ ρ(X)− Um1⊗ρ¯Xtr ≤ ϵ1,
and thusUd2 ◦ E(X,Ud2) ◦ ρ(X)− Ud2+d1⊗ρ¯Xtr ≤ ϵ + ϵ1 + ϵ2. 
4.1. Plugging in explicit constructions
We use Trevisan’s extractor, which was already shown to be quantum-proof in [6,5]. Specifically, we use the following
two instantiations of this extractor:
Theorem 4.2 ([5]). For every constant δ > 0, there exists E1 : {0, 1} n2 × {0, 1}O(log2(n/ϵ1)) → {0, 1}(1−δ)( n2−b) which is a
quantum-proof ( n2 ,
n
2 − b, ϵ1) strong extractor.
Theorem 4.3 ([5]). For every constants γ1, γ2 > 0, there exists E2 : {0, 1} n2 × {0, 1}O(log(n/ϵ2)) → {0, 1}k1−γ1 which is a
quantum-proof ( n2 , k, ϵ2) strong extractor, for k > n
γ2 .
Plugging these two constructions into Theorem 4.1 gives Theorem 1.3 which we now restate.
Theorem 1.3. For anyβ < 12 , γ > 0 and ϵ ≥ 2−n
(1−γ )/2
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, (1−β)n, ϵ) strong extractor
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n+ log ϵ−1) and output length m = Ω(n).
Proof. We set ϵ1 = ϵ2 = ϵ, b = βn, k = n2 − βn − log ϵ−1, γ2 = δ = 12 and γ1 < γ . In order to apply Theorem 4.1 we
need to verify that the output length of E2 is not shorter than the seed length of E1. This is indeed the case since
k1−γ1 ≥
n
2
− βn− n 1−γ2
1−γ1 ≥ n1−γ ≥ O log2 n
ϵ

.
The output length of E is 12 (
1
2 − β)n = Ω(n). 
5. The final extractor for the bounded storage model
We need the classical lossless condenser of [13].
Theorem 5.1 ([13]). For every α > 0 there exists an (n, k) →ϵ ((1 + α)k, k) strong lossless condenser C with seed length
O(log n+ log ϵ−1).
Plugging the condenser C and the extractor E of Theorem 1.3 into Theorem 3.1 gives Theorem 1.2, which we now restate.
Theorem 1.2. For any β < 12 and ϵ ≥ 2−k
β
, there exists an explicit (n, k, βk, ϵ) strong extractor against quantum storage,
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n+ log ϵ−1) and output length m = Ω(k).
Proof. Let ζ > 0 be a constant to be fixed later. The extractor E from Theorem 1.3, when the source length is set
to be 2(1 − β)(1 − ζ )k, is a quantum-proof 2(1 − β)(1 − ζ )k, (1 − β)k, ϵ strong extractor. In particular, it is a
2(1 − β)(1 − ζ )k, k, βk, ϵ strong extractor against quantum storage. Its output length is Ω(k). The theorem follows
by applying Theorem 3.1, using the condenser of Theorem 5.1 with α = 2(1 − β)(1 − ζ ) − 1. Since β < 12 there is a way
to fix ζ such that α > 0. 
Since Theorem3.1works in themore generalmodel of flat distributions, and since the extractor fromTheorem1.3 already
works in the most general setting, we get Theorem 1.1:
Theorem 1.1. For any β < 12 and ϵ ≥ 2−k
β
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, k, (1− β)k, ϵ) strong extractor for flat
distributions, E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n+ log ϵ−1) and output length m = Ω(k).
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